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THE STATE-APPLICATION-AND-CONVENTION
METHOD OF AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION:
THE FOUNDING ERA VISION
ROBERT G. NATELSON*
I. THE NATURE OF ARTICLE V AND THE CONVENTION PROCESS
Thank you all for coming. This is my first trip to Lansing, and I've seen
enough to hope that I get to come back-a lot. I'd like to thank everybody
responsible for setting up this Symposium. That would of course include
Professor Trudeau, who has been unfailingly competent and professional
throughout; Justice Brennan, who literally wrote the seminal article on this
subject;' the Cooley Law Review; and perhaps most of all, those people
who were responsible for setting up the tables, putting in the microphones,
getting the food and drink here, and making the general arrangements.
My primary area of research is the Founding Era.2 So, as the moderator
has just told you, I'm going to be setting the stage. I only have a half hour,
and there is a lot of material to cover, so I'll speak a little bit faster than I
normally like to; if you have questions or concerns, we can raise those on Q
and A. Don't try to get everything into your brain all at once.
There has been a great deal of misinformation, and there are many
questions about the state-application-and-convention process. Accordingly,
I'm going to put our concepts on "reset"-or perhaps give you an instant
replay-so we can look at the process the way the founders saw it.
However, one thing I hope you will never hear from my lips, at least today,
in discussing this particular type of convention, is the words-and I hope
this is the last time I'll say them-"constitutional convention" because a
convention for proposing amendments is not, properly speaking, a
constitutional convention. I often have made the mistake of calling it that,
but it is a serious mistake because it causes people to misunderstand what
the convention is all about. The Constitution gives the convention a
* Senior Fellow in Constitutional Jurisprudence, The Independence Institute,
Golden, Colorado; Senior Fellow in Constitutional Jurisprudence, Montana Policy
Institute, Bozeman, Montana; Senior Fellow, Goldwater Institute, Phoenix,
Arizona; Professor of Law at the University of Montana (Ret.); and author of The
Original Constitution: What It Actually Said and Meant (2011). This Transcript is
an adaptation of remarks to the Thomas M Cooley Law Review Article V
Symposium, September 16, 2010.
1. Thomas E. Brennan, Return to Philadelphia, 1 COOLEY L. REv. 1 (1982).
2. See About Rob Natelson, INDEPENDENCE INSTITUTE (Sept. 19, 2010),
http://constitution.i2i.org/about/.
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specific name-a convention for proposing amendments 3 -and I think we
should call it that or perhaps an Article V convention, an amendments
convention, or a convention of the states." Now, before I go into how the
founders looked at this process, I need to make two preliminary points.
Preliminary point number one: the way Article V works is that it
provides for amendments by empowering clusters of legislatures and
conventions.' It empowers state legislatures to apply for a convention for
proposing amendments. It empowers, under certain circumstances, state
legislatures to ratify amendments. It also authorizes conventions, and it
gives some powers to Congress.'
The powers under Article V arise by reason of grants from "We the
People," through the Constitution, and to these various conventions and
legislatures. Those power grants also bring with them certain subsidiary
powers that we call incidental powers.' And one reason it's important to
understand Founding Era custom is that it was established doctrine at the
time of the founding, and to a certain extent today, that incidental powers
are defined in part by custom.' In other words, the kinds of things that a
convention for proposing amendments can do-the kinds of things that the
applying states can do-are the kinds of things that it was customary for
3. U.S. CONsT. art. V ("The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses
shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a
Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all
Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures
of three fourths of the several States or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as
the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress .... ).
4. Variants of the term "convention of the states" were widely used in the
Founding Era and the nineteenth century to describe an Article V convention. See
Robert G. Natelson, Amending the Constitution by Convention: Practical Guidance
for Citizens and Policymakers at 2 (Part Three in a Three-Part Series), GOLDWATER
INSTITUTE (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.goldwaterinstitute.org/article/5730
[hereinafter Practical Guidance].
5. United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 733 (1931) (stating that Article V
grants power to Congress qua Congress, not to the U.S. government); Hawke v.
Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920); Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291, 1308 (N.D. Ill.
1975) ("[T]he delegation [from Article V] is not to the states but rather to the
designated ratifying bodies."). See generally Robert G. Natelson, Proposing
Constitutional Amendments by Convention: Rules Governing the Process, 78
TENN. L. REv. 693, 702-03 (2011) [hereinafter Natelson, Rules Governing].
6. Practical Guidance, supra note 4, at 6-7.
7. See generally Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Origins of the Necessary and
Proper Clause and The Framing and Adoption of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, in THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE at 88.
8. See id. at 65-66; Natelson, Rules Governing, supra note 5, at 704-06.
[Vol. 28:110
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them to do in 1788, the year the Constitution was ratified. So we have to
look at Founding Era customs to understand what it means to apply for a
convention, or to call a convention, or to propose amendments.
Preliminary point number two: we must understand thoroughly why
this state-application process was created. If you can take Article V-and I
realize it's a formidable block of type-and dissect it, you will see that
there are two methods for proposing amendments, and there are two
methods for ratifying amendments. And the convention method is one of
two ways of proposing amendments. The other way is for Congress to
propose them.9
Why did the founders provide for two separate methods of proposing
amendments? Well, they thought that Congress usually would do the
proposing because Congress was involved with the government and knew
how well things were working."o But the founders provided for this other
method that would come from the states because they recognized that
sometimes there would be a big problem that Congress couldn't or
wouldn't deal with." This has happened several times in our history.
Notably, just before the Civil War, a lot of people wanted compromise to
stave off war, and Congress was deadlocked and couldn't take the action
necessary. And so, some people suggested a convention as the ideal
mechanism to use, but the process never got far enough.12 So the state-
9. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
10. James Madison, Journal, reprinted in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 558 (Max Farrand, ed., Yale Univ. Press rev. ed. 1937)
(Sept. 10, 1787) (paraphrasing Alexander Hamilton as stating, "The National
Legislature will be the first to perceive and will be most sensible to the necessity of
amendments .. ).
11. Id. at 629. George Mason thought, before the convention proposal method
was added, that
the plan of amending the Constitution [was] exceptionable &
dangerous. As the proposing of amendments is in both the modes to
depend, in the first immediately, and in the second, ultimately, on
Congress, no amendments of the proper kind would ever be obtained
by the people, if the Government should become oppressive, as he
verily believed would be the case.
Id.; see also Robert G. Natelson, Amending the Constitution by Convention: A
Complete View of the Founders' Plan at 7-8 (Part One in a Three-Part Series),
GOLDWATER INSTITUTE (Sept. 16, 2010),
http://www.goldwaterinstitute.org/article/5005 [hereinafter Founders' Plan];
Natelson, Rules Governing, supra note 5.
12. See generally Robert G. Natelson, Learning from Experience: How the
States Used Article VApplications in America's First Century at 5-11 (Part Two in
a Three-Part Series), GOLDWATER INSTITUTE (Nov. 4, 2010),
http://www.goldwaterinstitute.org/article/5353 [hereinafter First Century].
11I2011]
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application-and-convention method is a way of bypassing Congress. That's
its purpose.
II. WHAT FOUNDING ERA HISTORY TELLS Us ABOUT How THE
STATE-APPLICATION-AND-CONVENTION PROCESS WAS To OPERATE
With those initial comments in mind-that the Constitution empowers
conventions and legislatures and that the state-application-and-convention
method was designed as a congressional bypass-let's look at what
conventions were during the Founding Era. This morning, I got an email.
The email quoted a person who purported to be a constitutional expert, who
said, You know the only federal convention that's ever been held was the
one that met in Philadelphia in 1787, and we don't really have much to go
on, and that's the only precedent we've got. I used to think that too, but it's
not true. It's very much not true-in fact, the convention, including the
federal convention, was a favorite device of the founding generation.
The original meaning of convention is just a meeting." But by the time
of the founding, the word had become identified with a particular type of
meeting: an ad hoc assembly that was designed to deal with government
problems, as opposed to a legislature that sits regularly.14 The convention
came together, addressed a problem, and then went home. There were
conventions in England in the seventeenth century: a convention that
brought back Charles II in 1660 after England's ill-fated experiment with
republicanism and a convention that brought William and Mary to the
throne in 1689.'1 There were conventions in seventeenth-century America.' 6
And there were many conventions during the Founding Era, so the
Founders had a great deal of experience with conventions.
Conventions set up new state governments after the royal governors
had been sent packing. Conventions ratified the United States Constitution.
Conventions also dealt with interstate problems: they sometimes were
called federal conventions. Among the federal gatherings was a convention
that met in Providence, Rhode Island, in 1776 and 1777, which dealt with
price-stabilization issues.
Here are a few more so you can get an idea of how many of these
gatherings there were." There was the Springfield Convention of 1777,
13. Founders'Plan, supra note 11, at 8.
14. Id. at 9.
15. RUSSELL L. CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKMANSHIP: AMENDMENT THE
CONSTITUTION BY NATIONAL CONVENTION 3-26 (1988) (outlining pre-1787
convention experience); See also Natelson, Rules Governing, supra note 5, at 706-
08, 715-19
16. Id. at 6-7.
17. Id. at 16-22.
12 [Vol. 28:1
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which addressed currency and wartime profiteering. There was a
convention in York, Pennsylvania, called by Congress in 1777, which dealt
with price inflation. A gathering in New Haven, Connecticut, in 1778,
addressed wartime economic regulation. There was another one in
Hartford, Connecticut, in 1779, and then a second Hartford convention in
1780. The first Hartford meeting addressed price stabilization, and the
second one treated the federal taxing power. There also was a Philadelphia
convention-and here I do not mean the one in 1787, but in 1780-which
addressed issues of price stabilization. Better known is the Annapolis
Convention of 1786, which was called to deal with commercial issues."
So there were many conventions. They had recognized prerogatives,
and they had recognized procedures. People understood how they worked
in a way that we typically don't understand today.
They say there are two types of people in the world: there are those
who divide everyone into two types of people, and then, there's everybody
else. Like all lawyers, I'm a classifier, so I'm going to divide conventions
into categories for you.
One category consists of the Founding Era conventions that met
exclusively within sovereignties, such as the state ratifying conventions.
Another category consists of those conventions that were meetings among
sovereignties, either in the diplomatic field or among American states. As
already suggested, the interstate gatherings sometimes were called federal
conventions. The two categories of conventions followed somewhat
different selection and voting rules. The delegates that met within
sovereignties were elected by the people and represented them directly.
However, the conventions that met among sovereignties-among states-
were constituted differently. Each state sent delegates to the convention,
and they voted at the meeting as states. 9 So the people were represented
but only indirectly.
Another set of categories among conventions is the following: first,
there were conventions that Founders, such as James Madison and
Alexander Hamilton, called plenipotentiary conventions.2 o These were
assemblies designed to deal with practically anything-erect a new
government, for example. But most of the Founding Era conventions fell
into another category: those designed for a special purpose-to solve a
particular problem. The delegates met and solved the problem (or decided
they couldn't solve it), and they went home.2 1
18. Id. at 22-24.
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In which categories does a convention for proposing amendments fit?
Is it a great popular convention directly elected by all the people of the
United States, or is it a federal convention? Is it a plenipotentiary
convention, as some people have suggested, that can do anything-even
overturn the government? Or is it a limited-purpose convention?
Once you examine the Founding Era record thoroughly, you can
deduce the answers to those questions virtually without uncertainty. It all
becomes very clear: a convention for proposing amendments is a federal
convention; it is a creature of the states or, more specifically, of the state
legislatures. And it is a limited-purpose convention. It is not designed to set
up an entirely new constitution or a new form of government.
How do we know that it's a federal convention? We know that it is a
federal convention because that was the only kind of interstate convention
the Founders ever knew, or likely ever considered.22 Indeed, when they
talked during the ratification process about conventions for proposing
amendments, they always talked about them as representing the states.
When, in 1789, Virginia and New York submitted the first applications
ever for an amendments convention, in each of their applications they
referred to the proposed gathering as one of "deputies from the several
states."23 And the same year, when the Pennsylvania Legislature refused to
follow Virginia and New York, and decided not to apply for an
amendments convention, Pennsylvania also referred to it as a "convention
of the states."24 So a convention for proposing amendments is not a
homogenized, national sort of assembly where every elector votes for
delegates from his or her own district; it is a collection of representatives of
the states. That shines through rather clearly from the Founding Era record.
The people are represented, but they are represented indirectly.
22. CAPLAN, supra note 15, at 16-22 (surveying federal conventions); see also
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819) ("[The Constitution]
was submitted to the people. They acted upon it in the only manner in which they
can act safely, effectively and wisely, on such a subject, by assembling in
convention. It is true, they assembled in their several states-and where else should
they have assembled? No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of
breaking down the lines which separate the states, and of compounding the
American people into one common mass.").
23. H.R. REP. No. 1, at 28-30 (1825) (reproducing the Virginia and New York
applications).
24. William Russell Pullen, The Application Clause of the Amending Provision
of the Constitution 23 (1951) (unpublished dissertation, University of North
Carolina) (on file with University Library, University of North Carolina) ("[T]he
calling of a convention of the states for amending the foederal [sic] constitution."
(quoting MINUTES OF THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF PA., 58-61, (1789))).
[Vol. 28:114
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Moreover, this understanding-that the convention for proposing
amendments is a collection of the states-continued to prevail throughout
the nineteenth century. For example, in 1831, in a case called Smith v.
Union Bank of Georgetown,25 the United States Supreme Court also
referred to a convention to propose amendments as a convention of the
states.26
Certain things flow from that conclusion, for better or for worse. The
delegates are agents of the state legislatures. They are subject to the
instruction of the state legislatures. The state legislatures have the power to
determine how the delegates are selected: they can choose the delegates
themselves or leave it to election by the people.27 It also follows that each
state gets one vote. It also follows that Congress may not alter that process,
as Congress has sometimes made motions toward doing.
Well, you might say, Isn't this really unfair? Does that mean that
states representing a small portion of the overall population could change
the Constitution? I think the Founders' answer to that was No, it's not
unfair because democracy is protected in the ratification process. You
need three-quarters of the states to ratify, and as a practical matter-
whatever the numbers might say theoretically-you cannot induce three-
quarters of the states to ratify anything unless the majority, or more likely a
substantial super-majority, of the American people favor it. Thus
democracy is protected.28
We next turn to the question of whether this is a limited or a
plenipotentiary convention. Once again, the answer to that comes from the
Founding Era record loud and clear and from authorities no less than James
Madison29 : this is a limited convention. It is designed to accomplish the
specific purpose of proposing amendments. From that, and from Founding
Era custom, it follows that the states may instruct their delegates and
specify in their applications what the scope of the convention will be. In
other words, if the states say, We want a convention to propose a balanced-
25. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 518 (1831).
26. Id. at 528.
27. Practical Guidance, supra note 4, at 4-6, 17.
28. Id. at 23.
29. Letter from James Madison to George Lee Turberville (Nov. 1788), in 11
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 330-31 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson
eds., 1977) (Madison made this clear in a November 1788 letter to George Lee
Turberville in which Madison distinguished between a convention that considers
"first principles," which "cannot be called without the unanimous consent of the
parties who are to be bound to it" and a convention to propose amendments, which
could be convened under the "forms of the Constitution" by "previous application
of 2/3 of the State legislatures.").
2011]1 15
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budget amendment, that's the scope of the agenda. The convention does not
have authority to go beyond that.
On this point, also, the evidence from the Ratification-Era debates is
overwhelming. Again and again, you see the assumption made by people at
the founding that the agenda of a convention for proposing amendments not
only could be fixed by the states, but that it usually would be. Thus,
Federalist writers, such as Tench Coxe, said that Congress must call a
general convention even though Congress dislikes the proposed
amendments.30 Proposed by whom? Proposed by the states in their
applications. Similarly, George Washington wrote in 1788 that under the
Constitution, a "constitutional door is open for such amendments as shall
be thought necessary by nine states""-nine being then the two-thirds
necessary to apply.32
Unfortunately, some of the collections reproducing these sources have
been published only in the last few years and have not been available to
prior writers." But when you examine these sources and see how people
discussed the convention for proposing amendments, the message is clear:
the convention was designed to address problems identified by the states.
To this conclusion, I add one caveat, however: the convention was to
be a deliberative body. The design was not for the states to dictate
particular language in their applications, thereby requiring the convention
to vote merely "yes" or "no." Rather, the applications were to identify areas
of concern or amendments designed to accomplish particular purposes,
leaving it to the convention to discuss, draft, and propose them.34
III. CORRECTING COMMON ERRORS
There are some claims that you hear over and over on this subject to
which I want to respond. It is sometimes said, notably for example, by
30. Tench Coxe, Pennsylvanian to the New York Convention, PA. GAZETTE,
June 11, 1788, reprinted in 20 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION
OF THE CoNsTruTIoN 1139, 1142-43 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2004).
31. Letter from George Washington to John Armstrong (Apr. 25, 1788),
http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/WasFi29.html.
32. See Founders' Plan, supra note 11, at 15-18, and Natelson, Rules
Governing, supra note 5, at 723-32, for additional evidence on the Founding Era
expectations.
33. See id. at 6 (explaining that another problem has been the lack of curiosity
many writers have had about the available sources, apparently because their
"scholarship" was written merely to serve pre-established conclusions).
34. Practical Guidance, supra note 4, at 2-3 (summarizing the Founding Era
evidence and the modem law on this point); Natelson, Rules Governing, supra note
5, at 742-47.
16 [Vol. 28:1
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Professor [Charles L. Black], that for the first one-hundred years of our
history there was no, or only one, state application for a limited
convention-and that, therefore, everybody understood that a convention
for proposing amendments had to be wide open."
There are two problems with that claim: first, what a state might have
done in 1850 or 1830 is really not very good evidence of what the Founders
intended. Second, the claim is flatly untrue. There were, in fact, a number
of specific single-subject applications by states in the first hundred years."
You can make an argument-I don't know if it's a winning argument, but
you can make an argument-that Virginia's 1789 application was for a
limited convention. South Carolina's 1832 application certainly was.
Alabama's 1833 application was designed to deal specifically with the
issue of federal taxing power. And Oregon's application of 1864 was
designed to deal specifically with the issue of slavery. So if you hear that
statement, that during the first hundred years all applications were general,
be aware that it is not accurate.
Another, even more common claim, runs like this: You know, we had
experience with a constitutional convention once before (notice the word
constitutional there)-we had experience with a constitutional convention
once before, in 1787, and it was a runaway. Those guys were brought to
Philadelphia to amend the Articles of Confederation, and they ignored the
limits and gave us a whole new form ofgovernment, didn't they?"
Well, of course they really didn't give us the new form of government;
the states had to ratify it. However, the problem with the claim goes beyond
that. The congressional call for the 1787 Convention did ask for
amendments to the Articles of Confederation, but under the law of the time,
particularly the law of agency, the scope of the 1787 Convention was not
set by Congress. It was set by the formal commissions issued to the
delegates from the various state legislatures.
When you interpret those commissions in light of eighteenth-century
legal and linguistic rules, you find that the commissions from ten of the
twelve states that sent delegates authorized those delegates to propose an
entirely new constitution. In other words, as to the overwhelming majority
of the delegates, the 1787 Convention was not a runaway. It was designed
to be a plenipotentiary convention, unlike the sort of convention we are
discussing today.37
35. Charles L. Black, Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman,
82 YALE L.J. 189, 202 (1972).
36. The applications are discussed in First Century, supra note 12, at 8-9, 13.
37. Founders'Plan, supra note 11, at 10-12; Natelson, Rules Governing, supra
note 5, at 719-23 (discussing the factual background of the 1787 federal convention
and the corresponding legal rules).
172011]
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IV. CONCLUSION
A great deal more can be learned about the state-application-and-
convention process from its history. For those in the audience who are
interested in knowing more about the process, I strongly recommend that
you study the campaign for direct election of senators in the late-nineteenth
and early-twentieth centuries. It is a case study in how states can use the
application process to successfully accomplish what they want to
accomplish. The advocates of direct election addressed a popular issue,
readily understandable by state lawmakers, and one on which Congress had
refused to act. Moreover, the advocates of direct election emphasized that
they were acting in accordance with Founding Era principles. They
carefully coordinated their campaign in a way that can be a model for
modem reformers.
So even if you disagree with the Seventeenth Amendment"-even if
you think that direct election of senators is horrible, and we need to go back
to selection by the state legislatures-please study that campaign. The
Progressives did a great job in using the application process, even though a
convention was never held."
I'd like to finish by giving you two quick plugs. One is for a book
called Constitutional Brinkmanship, by Russell Caplan.40 I picked up a
copy at Amazon.com for less than eight dollars, shipping included.
Caplan's book was published by Oxford University Press in the 1980s. It is
an excellent review and certainly the most thorough review of this process
up until the time he wrote it. There are a few problems in it, mostly due to
the fact Caplan did not have as much access to Ratification-Era material as
we are fortunate to have today. But generally, it is an excellent treatment.
The second plug is much more shameless: and that is starting today, on
the website of the Goldwater Institute,4 1 you can get my paper on the
38. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII ("The Senate of the United States shall be
composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six
years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have
the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State
legislatures. When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the
Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such
vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive
thereof to make temporary appointment until the people fill the vacancies by
election as the legislature may direct. This amendment shall not be so construed as
to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part
of the Constitution.").
39. See First Century, supra note 12, at 16-22.
40. CAPLAN, supra note 15.
41. Founders'Plan, supra note 11.
18 [Vol. 28:1
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Founders' vision for conventions for proposing amendments. It surveys the
evidence, gives you all the citations I left out in my main talk, and was
written without strong preconceptions. If anything, I may have had a
feeling that such a convention was not controllable, but I changed my view
to what the evidence told me. In other words, it's an honest piece of work;
it's not a piece of advocacy.
The Goldwater Institute, shortly, will publish second and third papers
from me on the same subject. The second will discuss the experience with
the state-application-and-amendment process during the late-eighteenth,
nineteenth, and early-twentieth centuries.42 The third will examine cases
issued on the subject by the Supreme Court and other federal courts and
deduce from all the evidence recommendations for state lawmakers.43
Thank you all very much. I have really enjoyed being here.
42. First Century, supra note 12.
43. Practical Guidance, supra note 4. See Natelson, Rules Governing, supra
note 5, where the material in all these papers is summarized and extensively
supplemented (summarizing rules for Article V conventions, based on both
historical and legal materials).
2011] 19
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